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Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the impact of zoning and pooling on brands, something not covered in depth in the 
historical literature. Also the paper is intended to present research into how brands in the food, drink and confectionery industries during the 
Second World War advertising utilised advertising in response to government control of the market. 
Design/methodology/approach – This paper is based on a close reading and interpretation of food, drink and confectionery brands 
advertisements from the Daily Express and Daily Mirror newspapers across the Second World War. Building on work by Burridge (2008) it 
explores different message strategies used by brands in response to shortages, zoning and pooling. 
Findings – While rationing has been discussed at length in the historical literature, zoning and pooling, have not. While brands provided 
information to their customers about rationing, shortages, zoning and pooling, the latter three also caused brands to apologise, look to the 
future and urge patience.  
Research limitations/implications – This study is based on the Daily Express and Daily Mirror from August 1939 to September 1945. 
Further research could explore other publications or the period after the war as control continued. Exploration of brand and agency archives 
could also provide more background into brands’ objectives and decision making. 
Originality/value – This is the first research to explore the impact of forms of control other than rationing on advertising during the Second 
World War. 
Keywords – Advertising history, Marketing history, Second World War, Britain, Rationing, Zoning, Pooling, Shortages 
Paper type – Research paper 
 
Introduction  
The Second World War saw extensive intervention in the food, drink and confectionery markets by 
the British Government, as they attempted to influence both the demand for, and the supply of, food 
available to British consumers. Much of the discussion of food on the home front in the historical 
literature focuses on rationing. An analysis of food, drink and confectionery advertising, in the Daily 
Express and Daily Mirror across the war however, illustrates that government control was more 
extensive than this. As well as controlling demand through rationing, the government also instituted 
measures that controlled the supply of goods. Even though they operated on the same markets, the 
objectives of these controls was different, rationing was designed to distribute a limited supply fairly 
while zoning and pooling attempted to ensure that the resources used to produce and distribute that 
supply were used as efficiently as possible. The purpose of this paper is first to illustrate that zoning 
and pooling had an important impact on brands in these sectors and secondly to demonstrate how this 
affected the advertising for these brands.  
This paper will explore how advertising dealt with zoning and pooling, both from the point of view 
of brands which were themselves in short supply or absent, or those which were offered as 
alternatives to brands in short supply. The exploration of these different types of control will expand 
the historical literature beyond the current concentration on rationing and allow a more nuanced 
discussion of government control generally during the war and its impact on advertising in particular. 
The examination of newspaper advertising, contemporary government documents and the historical 
literature indicates that zoning and pooling were widespread across British industry. Throughout the 
paper, different positioning strategies used by advertisers in response to shortages or absences will be 
discussed and tabulated, building on and extending the work done by Burridge (2008).  Finally, these 
strategies will be tabulated to highlight how these issues impacted on advertising.  
The food, drink and confectionery sectors were chosen because they represent all of the main 
forms of government market interference experienced during the war, with the exception of utility, 
giving a good illustration of most of the ways this interference affected advertising. Also as will be 
shown, the impact of zoning and pooling on these sectors was much greater than the average. The 
Daily Express and Daily Mirror were chosen due to their high level of circulation. According to Pugh 
(1998, citing Jenkins, 1986), in 1945 their circulation was 3.23 million and 2 million respectively.  
The paper begins, however, by discussing the literature related to food rationing and control and 
providing context through a discussion of advertisements which specifically mention rationing, or 
some element of it such as ration coupons. 
Rationing   
Food rationing was planned before the start of the Second World War based on “the experience of 
rationing in 1918” (Knight, 2011, p. 21). It was intended as a way to prevent the social unrest which 
resulted from food shortages and inflation in Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1917, as well 
as in Britain in 1916 (Mackay, 2003). There was also a concern for the health of the population 
(Knight, 2011, Woolton, 1959), which was seen as an ethical and morale concern (Woolton, 1959), 
was well having practical implications for Britain’s ability to win the war (Sitwell, 2017).  A 
contemporary account (Keezer, 1943, p. 266), writing for an American academic journal, noted that 
the Ministry of Food saw its role as “seeing that the people of Great Britain are properly nourished” 
and doing so “with a minimum of labor and materials is abasic objective”. According to Sitwell 
(2017, p. 73), there was a belief that “shortages meant that without rationing, there would not be 
sufficient food to go around”. However, due to public concerns about government interference, food 
rationing was not introduced immediately after the war began (Longmate, 1971).  Instead there were 
what Mackay (2003, p. 53) describes as “four months of free-for-all” before rationing began in 
January 1940 (Longmate, 1971), in response to the end of “imports of butter and bacon from 
Denmark” (Alcock, 2008, p. 11).  A detailed list of “the main commodities” rationed as of the 
beginning of 1942 is given by Richardson (1942).  
Rationing is dealt with at length in the historical literature of the British Home Front in the Second 
World War. As Zweiniger-Bargielowska (2000, p.1) states “Rationing, austerity, and fair shares 
occupy a central place in British history during and after the Second World War”. This is 
unsurprising, given its impact on the everyday lives of the people of Britain, it was according to 
Minns (1980, p. 86) “a way of life”. Zweiniger-Bargielowska (2000, p.2) gives another reason for this 
concentration when she describes “a growing interest in consumption among historians” compared to 
the “the traditional emphasis on production and the social relations of production”. 
As stated above, food rationing was an attempt to control demand for various products in short 
supply, in order to maintain social order and to reduce price inflation (Longmate, 1971; Jobling, 
2005). Other official efforts to interfere in the food, drink and confectionery markets were made on 
the supply side, on the firms producing these products, in an attempt to control production and 
transport. The two supply side activities which most visibly impacted on the advertising for food, 
drink and confectionery brands were zoning and pooling. As will be shown, these had major impacts 
on both these industries and the war effort, but they are largely absent from the historical literature. A 
major contribution of this paper will be to address this gap. 
  
Zoning and Pooling 
Zoning and pooling, were related but different solutions to the same problem; how to make most 
efficient use of the resources available to produce enough food for the British population, while 
freeing up resources to support the rest of the war effort (Felton, 1945). As far as the food, drink and 
confectionery industries were concerned, the process was managed by the Ministry of Food. In each 
case the Ministry set up bodies to administer the process, which firms in the industry were required to 
join, for example, The Cake and Biscuit Manufacturers’ War Time Alliance. Drawing on 
contemporary papers held in the National Archives (TNA) and post war reflections on these schemes, 
zoning and pooling will now be discussed in a little more detail. 
The first step to zoning or pooling was the same, concentration of production, which involved 
limiting the number of factories in an industry, while at the same time attempting to balance labour 
requirements across the country (Felton, 1945). Felton (1945) in fact discussed concentration, zoning 
and pooling as the precursor to rationing. Concentration involved closing some factories and creating 
nucleus factories for each area, in order to make the most efficient use of the available factories, 
workers and transport. According to Allen (1972, p.167), this “policy made an important contribution 
to the task of transferring resources from peacetime to wartime purposes”. Allen (1972, pp. 172-3) 
goes on to say that through concentration, “about 3,500 establishments” across approximately 70 
“branches of industry” had been closed by July 1943. By the same time, it was estimated, 257,000 
workers had been released, by concentration and other schemes, such as zoning and pooling. 
Once concentration was complete, a decision was made by the Ministry as to whether more 
savings could be made, both from closing factories and limiting the areas in which their output could 
be sold. In some cases it was limited, for example the soap industry (also administered by the Ministry 
of Food) was considered to already be sufficiently efficient that no more savings could be made, 
beyond ending the production of some brands (Davis, 1942). The choice between zoning and pooling 
appears to have been driven by a trade-off between limiting the use of resources and maintaining 
customer choice. Pooling was chosen for industries such as soft drinks where the choice between 
brands was limited, in that standard flavours were produced and where the government wanted to 
further limit this choice (Felton, 1945). Also in the margarine industry, the product was relatively 
standardised, and was also impacted by the inclusion of vitamins to make it as heathy as butter 
(Felton, 1945) pooling made sense. These pooled industries were also zoned (Forrest, 1942), though 
this is less obvious as the nucleus factories produced the same ‘brands’, so consumers would not 
know who produced it or where.  
A pamphlet issued by The Cake and Biscuit Manufacturers’ War Time Alliance in June 1943, held  
by TNA stated that “‘Zoning’ means the total exclusion of a manufacturer from every part of the 
United Kingdom except that area officially allocated to him as his zone” (“The Zoning of …”, 1943). 
The same document also indicated that “the purpose of Zoning is to save fuel, vehicles, man-power 
and rail haulage” (“The Zoning of …”, 1943). In essence, the objective is the same as the 
concentration scheme, of which this is an evolution. The effectiveness of zoning can be seen in the 
biscuit industry, in which by August 1943 the average miles travelled by each ton of biscuits had 
reduced “from 158.5 to 108.5 from the period before [zoning]” (“Minutes of the 40th…..”, 1943, p. 4). 
The zones were created by combining Divisional Food Areas (DFAs), the same ones that provided the 
basis for the administration of rationing, based on the number of firms in the industry. For example, 
there were only three zones in the crispbread zoning scheme due to “the small number of firms 
involved” (Bailey, 1942). As far as possible an element of choice was left, albeit more limited than 
before. 
As well as the documents held in TNA, zoning and pooling are mentioned in other primary 
sources, albeit in a limited manner. For example, within Mass Observation (MO) there are some 
mentions in both diaries and reports, which illustrate how they affected the public. For example, the 
MO report “Miscellaneous Morale Material …” (1943, p. 3) illustrates how one female respondent 
believed that the shortage of biscuits are due to zoning. Another quite negative reference was in the 
published MO diary of Kathleen Hey, a shop worker, who relays a story told by travelling salesman 
that multiple retailers were able to get around zoning for “salmon and other things” by buying in one 
zone and distributing the goods across their own network. On a more positive note, the “Coal 
Shortage Report: Chelsea” (1945) contained a quote suggesting coal deliveries should be zoned like 
milk. Mant’s (2009) history of the Women’s Land Army in the Second World War contains a joke 
told by one former Land Girl about the lack of a milk zoning scheme in her village. For this joke to be 
told in an oral history, decades after the war, in an expectation it would be understood by its audience 
implies that zoning was well know and remembered. Overall however, there are few references to 
zoning and pooling in diaries, and those references are generally short. The implication is that despite 
the impact on the war effort the public did not see zoning and pooling as important, if they noticed it 
at all. Rationing was a much bigger, more obvious presence in the lives of the British people and their 
writing reflects this. It is likely that this has played a part in the limited discussion of zoning and 
pooling in the historical literature. A more nuanced reading of these sources is required to determine 
the extent to which discussions of rationing or shortages are actually related to zoning and pooling. 
Zoning and Pooling in the Historical Literature. 
While rationing has been the subject of numerous academic studies and even cookbooks, zoning and 
pooling have not been studied in any depth, despite their impact on the war effort. The closest to an 
in-depth analysis came soon after the war. Felton’s (1945) very positive discussion of how the Home 
Front was supplied discussed both zoning and pooling. “Lessons of the British War Economy” 
originally published in 1954 (Allen, 1972) contains a discussion of concentration (but not zoning). 
Later, however, the only mentions of zoning and pooling in the literature are small parts of bigger 
discussions on other aspects of the war. For example, Edgerton (2012) in his re-examining of Britain’s 
strength during the war mentions concentration in relation to slaughterhouses and cheese. Burridge 
(2008, p.397) refers to a “voluntary de-branding” in the margarine industry, however, he frames it as 
an aspect of rationing. Brayley and McGregor’s (2005) short popular history of the home front 
mentions the zoning of chocolate and confectionery. The most recent mention by Clampin (2014) is 
more extensive as he discusses the impact of pooling, though not zoning, on advertising generally, 
using Stork margarine as an example. 
Even those sources related to food or its control during the war only briefly deal with zoning and 
pooling, concentrating as they do on rationing, though again the earliest ones are most detailed. Brady 
(1950) discusses the pooling of margarine while Hammond (1954), discusses the objectives of zoning. 
One surprising exception to the relatively good coverage in early literature, is the memoir of Lord 
Woolton, the Minister of Food from 1940-43 (Woolton, 1959) which does not mention either pooling 
or zoning. This is reflected in Sitwell’s (2017) biography of Woolton, which draws heavily on 
Woolton’s memoir does not mention zoning at all. The only mention of the impact of concentration is 
a caption to a photography discussing the pooling of cheese production, which prohibited the 
production of all cheeses except cheddar (Sitwell, 2017). Zweiniger-Bargielowska’s (2000) book 
about control mentions zoning only in relation to is end and does not discuss concentration at all. Just 
as there might be in diaries, there can also be misidentification of zoning and pooling in the historical 
literature. Burridge (2008, p.397), for example, refers to concentration in the margarine industry as 
“voluntary de-branding”, however he actually discusses this as a form of rationing. Overall this lack 
of detailed analysis leaves a gap in the historical literature and in understanding of how industry was 
organised in Britain during the war and how the home front was fed. 
Methodology 
This research draws on a study of advertisements drawn from the Daily Express and Daily Mirror 
across the Second World War. This research, which is part of a PhD into newspaper advertising is 
based on a content analysis of 11,512 general advertisements which include 2,047 advertisements for 
food, drink and confectionery brands. These advertisements have been sampled from the first full 
week of each month across the first two and last two years of the war. This sample was decided on 
upon to allow the difference in advertising between the beginning of the war and the end, along with 
any seasonal variations across each year, to be explored.  
However, while this coding was being carried out, it was noted that a number of these advertisements 
towards the end of the war specifically mentioned zoning. An analysis of the completed coding 
indicated that 4.2% of advertisements coded between August 1943 and September 1945 specifically 
mentioned zoning. Further analysis identified that across the same time period 21.51% of food, drink 
and confectionery advertisements specifically mentioned zoning. While very few advertisements 
mentioned pooling specifically (less than 0.18%) again the percentage for food and drink 
advertisements was higher (0.89%) though no confectionery brands mentioned pooling (which is not 
surprising as they were zoned rather than pooled). Further reading, however, indicated that there were 
a number of advertisements did appear to be affected by pooling, even if it was no mentioned. As a 
result of this discovery, a deep reading of food, drink and confectionery brand advertisements, from 
both newspapers across the war was carried out. 
Rationing in Advertising 
As Burridge (2008, p. 392) states “As well as being a problem, rationing was also a resource for 
advertisers – it was something that could be invoked and used in various ways” (emphasis in original). 
Therefore, the response to the introduction of rationing differed between industry sectors and brands, 
although most of the advertisements mentioning rationing in January, February, March and April 
1940 were from brands in the food and drink sector.  
The research shows that a number of brands, as early as October and November 1939, anticipated 
the beginning of rationing of food through to early January. Many of these early advertisements, 
featured positioning strategies, i.e., attempts to influence how consumers perceived the brand, and 
messages for the brands which would be repeated throughout the war. The idea that different 
positioning strategies might be used was proposed by Burridge (2008) who identified seven strategies 
in advertisements in women’s magazines across the whole period of rationing (Table I).  
 
 Woman’s Own Woman & Home Total 
Product is available and a solution or 
substitute for rationed goods 
35 6 41 
Product is available, because it is 
‘‘essential’’  
2 1 3 
Product is the same as pre-war, or, 
better now  
4 0 4 
Product is scarce _ but worth it when 
you get it  
7 0 7 
Product is currently unavailable _ 
provision of a substitute service 
3 3 6 
Product is currently unavailable _ it 
will be back soon  
8 3 11 
The product is back now or available 
again  
9 3 12 
 
Total 68 16 84 
 
Table I Incidence of positioning strategies by magazine, 1940-1955 (Burridge, 2008, p. 323)  
 
Overall Burridge’s (2008) typology is a very useful beginning to exploring the nature of 
advertising in the Second World War. However, by failing to differentiate the impact of rationing 
(designed to ensure equal shares of a limited supply by limiting demand) from the impact of the 
measures that controlled supply, a good deal of nuance is lost. This is particularly true in cases where 
influences on both demand and supply were present. Therefore this paper will explore the extent to 
which specific message strategies can be identified related specifically to zoning and pooling. First 
however, Burridge’s strategies will be briefly described.  
 
Messages Relating to Rationing 
One of the earliest advertisements relating to rationing, a Bovril advertisement from October 1939, 
which predated the rationing of food, in January 1940 (Minns, 1980) contains the explicit statement 
that “Bovril isn’t rationed!” As Clampin (2009) indicates, the positioning strategy of offering ‘a 
solution or substitute for rationed goods’, in particular by making them go further was followed 
through the war by “the producers of sauces, meat extracts, condiments and soups”. The further claim 
that Bovril helped to get “more good from all your food” supports the view that the advertisement was 
intended to position Bovril as something consumers needed “now more than ever”.  This matched 
closely the stance of the Ministry of Food which revolved around making the best use of the available 
food, however unusual or unappetising (Minns, 1980). Chivers took a similar approach, suggesting in 
an advertisement in the Daily Express in January 1940, that “in these days of food rationing” their 
range of jellies meant that “hospitality need not make demands upon your family sugar allowance”. 
One of a variety of messages around rationing and shortages was a similar approach taken by 
Weetabix, based on the pre-war habit of having bacon for breakfast and positioning the brand as a 
replacement meal (Clampin, 2014, p. 83). 
This approach was also aimed, by a number of different brands, at parents who were worried about 
the impact of rationing and shortages on the health of their children. This began very early in the war 
by brands such as Virol and continued throughout the war by a number of other brands. This Virol 
advertisement, takes both an informative and emotional approach, comparing the brand to ‘other 
“extras”’ in its positive impact on children’s growth. Virol positioned themselves to replace the 
benefits of products no longer available, as a ‘solution’, even though they might not be able to fulfil 
the role of the product in consumers’ diets. In February 1940, Walters’ Palm Toffee took a similar 
position, as a way to replace the sugar that was now missing from children’s diets. This was a position 
which would be taken by other confectionery brands as the war progressed, in relation to shortages 
generally, rather than rationing in particular.  
The final approach taken in relation to the ‘solution or substitute’ positioning, could be called 
‘doing without’, in which the brand claims that using it would allow consumers to do without the 
rationed product, when their ration ran out. For example, this was the approach taken by Ryvita in 
March 1940, claiming that their brand was so good that it meant butter was not necessary.  A similar 
approach was taken by Hovis and Creamola Custard Pudding in relation to butter and eggs 
respectively, both in 1940.  
One strategy not mentioned by Burridge is providing information. The provision of information is 
a role of advertising, particularly in the case of high involvement purchase decisions, where the 
consumer has more incentive to seek and take in information (Petty, Cacioppo and Schumann, 1983). 
While food would normally be considered a low involvement decision, it could be argued that during 
the Second World War, this changed. For example, according to Minns (1980, p. 89) “for women war 
workers, shopping was usually a nightmare” due to the need to fit shopping around shifts. Adding to 
this, the complexities of the rationing and control system and shortages of familiar foods or absence of 
favoured brands, it all meant that more thought and planning was needed by (mainly) women, than in 
the pre-war period. This point was made by Gardiner (2005, p. 181) who stated that “rationing was 
essentially something that women organised and mediated”.   
There is a degree of overlap between certain positioning strategies and the provision of 
information. For example, between the making things go further aspect of the ‘solution or substitute’ 
positioning and the provision of information. While the first makes a claim that the brand can make 
other goods go further, the second shows how. This will however, be more relevant, particularly in the 
early years of the war, for advertisements relating to shortages generally, rather than rationing 
specifically. This is in part because rationing of the product was not often explicitly mentioned, 
instead the shortage of the brand would be. 
The provision of information, therefore can be seen as an important message style adopted by 
brands in response to rationing and to other aspects of control and shortages generally, as will be seen 
later in this paper. This information took a number of forms, though specifically in relation to 
rationing, it often centred on the administration of the process. In the context of this research, the 
information message does not mean ‘general’ information, such as brand names or addresses, but 
instead only information specifically relevant to rationing, zoning, pooling, shortages or absent 
brands. As will be seen, beyond the area of rationing, quite complex information could be provided by 
advertising brands in response to zoning, pooling, shortages and absent brands. In some cases, for 
example, brands provided detailed information in the form of recipes, or even recipe books and 
services, as in the case of Stork Margarine (Clampin, 2014).  
Zoning in Advertising 
For brands, zoning presented a quite complex situation for their advertising to deal with. First, brands 
had to explain a new and complex system to their customers as well as how it affected the brand. 
Second, they had try to sell their brand to one group of consumers who may still be able to purchase 
it, albeit in limited quantities, while trying to maintain brand awareness and keep a good image with 
another, larger group who could not obtain the brand. Compared to brands which were simply 
rationed, the need for information was therefore much greater. As Figure 1 demonstrates, in some 
cases part of the burden of educating consumers was taken on by the temporary industry bodies, such 
as the Chocolate and Sugar Confectionery (War-Time) Association, created by the Ministry of Food 
to administer the control of industry during the war.  
 
 
 Figure 1 Chocolate and Sugar Confectionery (War-Time) Association Advertisement, June 1943 (Daily Mirror, 28 June 1943) 
 
The use of a map to illustrate the zones by brands continued at least into 1944, as shown in Figure 2. 
This illustrates that even once the initial scheme was in place, and had been for a while, brands still 
felt the need to explain where they were, and hence were not, available. In part this need could be a 
result of inconsistency between the schemes. For example, as discussed in the literature review and 
illustrated in Figure 2, the crispbread industry had three zones, while the confectionery industry was 
split into four, Figure 1. It is likely that this would have caused some confusion for consumers, 
particularly if the zones for other products were different. This confusion is likely to be greater for 
consumers living in those DFAs that were in different zones for different products. For example 
consumers living in the West Midlands would be in the Southern Zone for crispbreads, but the 
Western Zone for chocolates and sweets. The use of the phrase “Vita-Weat is playing ‘hide and seek’ 
in the Vita-Weat advertisement implies that some consumers at least were confused by the 
combination of zoning and shortages.
.  
  
Figure 2 Vita-Weat Advertisement. (Daily Express, 22 April 1944) 
As well as explaining and offering information, some brands, also used some of their 
advertisements to apologise to their customers in the zones where they were not available. It is 
important to note that the apologies in these advertisements were used in relation to zoning, but not in 
relation to rationing, even though chocolates and sweets were also rationed. As will be seen, apologies 
were used in relation to other causes of brand shortages or absence but not rationing. The implication 
is that brands did not feel the need to apologise for rationing, implying that rationing was not a brand 
issue and consumers did not blame the brand for any rationing problems.
  
Figure 3 Fox’s Glacier Mints Advertisement. (Daily Mirror, 28 August 1943) 
Figures 2 and 3 also both contain another message strategy used in relation to zoning and pooling, 
linking the return of the brand to the end of the war. Fox’s Glacier Mints went further than Vita-Weat, 
by indicating that the zoning of the brand was playing a part in ending the war, while Vita-Weat 
merely referred to the return of the brand to the whole country after victory. The mention of victory, 
rather than the end of the war, is possibly because the Vita-Weat advertisement appears later in the 
war victory seemed certain. Looking to the future like this, was important for brands in order attempt 
to maintain loyalty. This is important for brands which for one reason or another were not available to 
some or all of their consumers. 
While shortages of a brand meant that supplies may be limited or intermittent, it was still 
reasonable for brands to advise customers to seek out the brand or wait for it to come into stock (as 
indicated by Burridge’s, 2008, positioning strategies). The need to maintain loyalty and brand 
awareness was important, but could be reinforced by at least occasional use and some degree of 
visibility. For brands which were zoned, however, most consumers would not be able to get the brand 
at all until the end of war. This leads to one of the main roles of advertising during the Second World 
War, helping brands attempt “to keep their names before the public, even though their goods might 
not be available” (Nevett, 1982, p.169). The MO “Interim Report on Biscuits” (1945) supports this 
mentioning that “prestige advertising outside the zoning areas has kept the makers name in mind”. In 
these cases mentions of the return of the brand, gave consumers a reason to remember it. Alongside 
this the use of the brand characters, such as Mr Peek and Mr Frean or Fox’s bear was linked to the 
need to ensure that the brand “remains at the forefront of the audience’s thoughts” (Herskovitz and 
Crystal, 2010, p. 21). Arguably this was even more important in the absolute absence of those brands 
in industries which had been pooled. 
Pooling  
Pooling impacted on advertising in two main ways. First through advertisements for the original 
brands and second for the newly created ‘national brand’. The most common advertiser among the 
‘de-branded’ brands, was Stork Margarine, which along with the other margarine brands, was 
subsumed into Marcom. Stork continued to advertise across the whole war (and in the period after the 
war when rationing and pooling continued). In August 1940, “in order to keep the name alive” 
(Harvey, 1991, p. 12) and “in an effort to add value to the Stork brand” (Clampin, 2014, p. 52), Stork 
introduced the Stork Margarine Cookery Service. The announcement was made through “a modest 
press campaign” (Harvey, 1991, p.12), such as Figure 4 below. The language used, stating that the 
brand “joins up” along with the imagery of the Stork brand character standing in a military manner 
with a rifle and helmet, gives a clear implication that the disappearance of the brand was intended to 
aid the war effort. This is language and imagery that would have been familiar to consumers at the 
time, both from the First and Second World Wars. This, similar to the use of Bertie Bassett discussed 
earlier, is a clear attempt to position the disappearance of the brand as a positive thing, a necessary 
sacrifice to win the war. Stork’s use of their character in this way however, was only temporary, as 
can be seen in Figure 8b, as opposed to Bassett’s more consistent portrayal of Bertie Bassett as a 
British soldier.  
What Stork also did was begin to make use of another positioning strategy outlined by Burridge 
(2008) (see Table I), specifically ‘brand is currently unavailable - provision of a substitute service’. 
Indeed, Burridge uses Stork as an example of this positioning strategy. However, as mentioned 
earlier, Burridge discusses this in relation to the rationing of margarine and other products, more than 
the disappearance of Stork. Stork itself was absent due to pooling so could not itself serve as a 
solution or a substitute for rationed products. However, by providing expertise to consumers, in the 
form of ‘a substitute service’, the brand provided a solution to the problems caused by control and 
shortages. The hope being that as the war progressed and the service solved more of the consumers’ 
problems the name would be associated with expertise and gain other positive associations of 
helpfulness at a time of need. While the associations actually made are impossible to judge so many 
years after the war, it is clear that the number of consumers seeking help from the service increased, 
from 10,000 in 1940 “to 1 million by 1947” (Harvey, 1991, p. 12). In part this success is likely to 
have resulted from the flexibility of the service, adapting to different seasons, different levels of food 
supply and a variety of food types, both rationed and not (Harvey, 1991). 
 
  
Figure 4 Stork Margarine Cookery Service Advertisement. (Daily Mirror, 1 August 1940) 
This approach of promoting the individual brand outside of the pooled product was not unique to 
Stork, although Stork were the only pooled brand in the two newspapers to advertise consistently over 
the course of the war. Other brands began to advertise in the later years of the war, anticipating their 
return, when victory began to seem more certain. Kraft Cheese (1943) for example, advertised in late 
1943, apologising that “there’s no Kraft Cheese now being made!”, using a similar approach to Stork 
of providing a recipe for consumers, without explicitly mentioning pooling. In this case though, Kraft 
implies pooling, stating that “Kraft plants [are] making cheeses, but not Kraft”. In fact, cheese was 
pooled under an organisation called BACAL as margarine was under MARCOM (Nicol, 2009). 
Kraft’s approach differs slightly from the Stork Cookery Service by concentrating on recipes that use 
the product (if not the specific brand) being advertised. This was likely an attempt to reposition cheese 
as “a main dish”, which would be likely to increase sales of cheese after the war.  
Pooling also effected the advertising messages used by the new industry bodies. As these new 
entities did not have any direct competition, their only purpose in advertising would be to inform 
consumers of the new situation and persuade them that the new brand was worth buying. As J. W. 
Fletcher of the Co-operative Society (cited by Harrison and Madge, 1940, p. 371) noted in 1940, in 
relation to the pooling of margarine, consumers had “no confidence” in the pooled brand and viewed 
it as “a poor substitute, not only for butter, but for the brand of margarine with which she has been 
satisfied for many years”. As this was written in 1940, it is likely that the government had noted this 
problem by the time other industries were pooled, hence the efforts of the industry bodies to promote 
the pooled brand. 
Figure 5 illustrates how the pooled Soft Drink Industry (S.D.I.) used advertising to persuade 
consumers of the value of the new pooled brand. Figure 5 also indicates that as well as being pooled, 
soft drinks were also zoned and points out, in a simple, informative advertisement the benefits of the 
system. 
 
Figure 5 Soft Drinks Industry Advertisement, (Daily Mirror, 1 April 1944) 
 
The importance of rationing to Second World War advertising is clear, and while the other 
elements of control, zoning and pooling arguably have less influence, they still have a major impact. 
For example, as this paper shows, zoning and pooling both required explanation and apologies. 
Perhaps however, shortages had a greater influence than both. 
 
Shortages 
As Gardiner (2005, p. 22) points out “just because something was not rationed, it did not mean it was 
in plentiful supply – quite the reverse”, in fact as Longmate (1971, p.22) states, “there was a great 
deal of nothing about”. In fact, more advertisements mentioned some aspect of shortages than 
mentioned rationing.  
There are two issues that need to be noted about this difference. Firstly, there is some degree of 
overlap between mentions of rationing and shortages, as some advertisements will mention both. For 
example, Palm Toffee, which was discussed earlier had positioned itself as a way to replace sugar in 
children’s diets, was one of the few brands to specifically announce it was rationed. The explicit 
positioning of the brand as a replacement for sugar had been replaced, once sweets were rationed, 
with a more oblique link that the brand “strengthens, sustains”, as Figure 6 shows. This Palm Toffee 
advertisement specifically mentioned they were rationed, but also requests that disappointed 
customers “Don’t blame the shopkeeper”, a sub-set of the ‘Be patient and wait for supplies’ message, 
illustrated in Table II, below. Secondly, quite often advertisements for products which were rationed, 
would quite often not mention rationing, but rather say that the brand was in short supply. This seems 
at first glance to be odd, however it does fit with the discussion of Burridge’s (2008) positioning 
strategies listed in Table I. Most of the advertisements discussed in his study which mentioned 
rationing adopted the Burridge (2008) strategy of ‘the product is available and a solution or substitute 
for a rationed good’ position. Therefore, it was mainly brands which were not rationed products which 
mentioned rationing. For the rationed products themselves, the rationing was not mentioned, possibly 
because it was imposed at product level and on the consumers rather than impacting the brand 
particularly. In fact, as previously shown, brands which were rationed were also often zoned or pooled 
as well and this played a much bigger part in their advertising. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Palm Toffee Advertisement. (Daily Mirror, 10 May 1941) 
A number of different messages relating to shortages appeared across the war, the most consistent 
message was related to ‘Making things go further / make do and mend’. However, before more 
detailed discussion of some of the messages which appeared, it is also important to note that as 
Burridge (2008, p. 391) states, “an advert can do more than one thing at a time” and so, as will be 
shown, quite often advertisements carried more than one message about shortages at a time. 
The messages related to shortages are different from Burridge’s positioning strategies and 
represent a contribution to the historical literature. Extrapolated from Burridge’s strategies, the 
messages in Table II represent a number of different responses to various forms of market control and 
causes of shortages. The rest of the paper will explore these messages and indicate which aspects of 
control and shortages they were used in response to. 
 
Message 
Brand is not rationed 
Doing without 
Information 
Explanation 
Apology 
After the war / victory 
Be patient and wait for supplies 
Be patient with the shopkeeper 
Making products last / go 
further 
Make do and mend 
 
Table II Advertising Messages Relating to Market Control and Shortages 
Make Things Go Further / Make Do and Mend 
The most common rationing and shortages related messages concerned making things go further or to 
make do and mend. There is an overlap here with the ‘solution or substitute’ positioning strategy 
identified by Burridge (2008), in that some of these messages relate to the brands used to support 
other products that are rationed. As discussed earlier, this included “the producers of sauces, meat 
extracts, condiments and soups” (Clampin, 2009, p. 60) who positioned their brands as being useful in 
making wartime diets more interesting and making the limited available food go further. An example 
of this is Bisto explicitly claiming to “make the most of your ration” or saying that with Bisto “your 
meat ration will go much further and taste better”. Rowntree’s Cocoa’s approach included the claim 
that their brand made “every meal go further” soon after the war began. This was an evolution from 
their pre-war claim which was about stretching housewives’ budgets.  
Other brands used the approach of positioning themselves as alternatives to products in short 
supply, similar to Burridge’s (2008) first positioning strategy, throughout the war, for example 
Weetabix (Figure 7) and Kellogg’s Corn Flakes, positioned themselves as a way to save both fuel and 
bacon, since they could replace the traditional British breakfast choice of bacon and eggs (Clampin, 
2014, citing the Statistical Review of Press Advertising). Also Clampin (2014 p. 83, citing the 
Statistical Review of Press Advertising) indicates that Kellogg’s Corn Flakes had the biggest increase 
in advertising spend in late 1939, “from £15 in October to £3,009 in November 1939”, in response to 
the announcement of the rationing of bacon on 1 November 1939. The positioning of cereals as an 
alternative to traditional cooked breakfasts continued throughout the war, even after cereals were 
themselves rationed in 1942 (Mackay, 2003). The Kellogg’s Corn Flakes advertisement, from January 
1943, includes another tactic used by many advertisers, to help consumers deal with shortages, 
providing instructions on how to make up for shortages in other products or how to make the brand 
either last longer or be more useful. As discussed earlier, the provision of information is common in 
advertising for high involvement purchasing decisions. 
Rather than make suggestions about other products, some brands in short supply actually 
suggested that consumers make the brand itself last or use it sparingly and sometimes gave advice on 
how to do that. This ‘make the brand last / use sparingly’ message begins to become relatively 
common at the end of 1940 and the beginning of 1941. From the point of view of the brand this 
served a double purpose, firstly it portrayed a patriotic message of self-denial and secondly it reduced 
the risk of consumers trying (and perhaps liking) competitor brands. In some cases the advice was 
fairly straightforward, for example, a Mars Bar and Starry Way campaign in 1942 suggested cutting 
the bars into sections to make them last longer. Other brands offered more complex instructions often 
in the form of recipes, frequently including ways for brands, such as Weetabix, to be used in 
unfamiliar ways to extend food supplies. In some cases the brand simply suggested that consumers 
use less of the brand, for example a number of chocolate brands beginning in 1941 asked consumers 
to “leave it for the children”. 
 
Figure 7 Weetabix Advertisement (Daily Express, 4 April 1940) 
 
Finally some advertisements simply referred to the ‘Make do and Mend’ campaign. In some cases 
these were actually quite general branding advertisements, seeking to associate a brand that was 
absent or in short supply with a patriotic campaign, as in the case of a Quick Quaker Oats 
advertisement from February 1944 (Figure 8). In some advertisements using the ‘make do and mend’ 
message, there was little direct relevance to the brand, as in the case of Quick Quaker Oats, although 
the comparison to “cheerfully accepting the ‘next best’” does create a link. This is an attempt by the 
brand to prevent consumers permanently switching to the new brands they were forced to try by the 
absence of Quick Quaker Oats. 
 
  
Figure 8 Quick Quaker Oats Advertisement, (Daily Express, 4 February 1944) 
 
While the ‘making products go further / make do and mend’ message was the most common at the 
beginning of the war, by the beginning of 1941, this had changed. Messages relating to patience and 
to explanations for shortages began to become more prevalent. 
 
Wait For Supplies / Be Patient / Be Patient with Retailers  
As with the Quaker advertisement, it is likely that part of the reason for brands asking for patience 
from consumers in this way, is an attempt to prevent brand switching. As will be seen however, most 
of the ‘be patient’ messages do not mention explicitly that the brand will be back soon, simply that 
patience is needed. 
The confectionery sector made most use of the ‘patience with shopkeepers’ message from 
December 1940 and the first few months of 1941. In part this is because of the large number of 
individual brands owned by single organisations in the confectionery sector. In particular Rowntree, 
produced a number of different brands, each of which asked customers to be patient with shopkeepers 
when stocks were short, and each of whose advertisements appeared in both papers. Mass 
Observation (MO) diaries and publications give an indication why these messages were considered 
necessary. For example, shopkeeper S.J. Cartey’s MO diary for 5 and 8 February 1941 indicates that 
on both these days he was “unable to supply” “nearly every other person who comes into the shop” 
(Cartey, 1941). That these problems could lead to confrontations between customers and retailer is 
illustrated by Kathleen Hey’s published MO diary (Hey, 2016), which indicates the level of abuse 
some shopkeepers were subject to from customers frustrated at not being able to get the products they 
want. According to “one girl observer who serves in her father’s shop” this could even sometimes 
escalate to violence (Harrison and Madge, 1940, p. 128). 
 
 Figure 9 Rowntree’s Fruit Clear Gums Advertisement. (Daily Mirror, 6 February 1941) 
It can be seen, however, that these messages of patience from Rowntree are much more low-key 
than that from Palm Toffee in Figure 6. Rather than being a central part of the message, the request 
for ‘patience with shopkeepers’ appears only at the bottom of each advertisement, using almost 
identical language. The request, “don’t blame the shopkeeper” is followed by a claim that both the 
shopkeeper and the brand “do their best to keep a fair supply all over the country with the materials 
available”. It is likely that this difference is because the Palm Toffee advertisements were from an 
individual brand’s campaign, with its own message, relating to the patience message. However, the 
Rowntree’s advertisement, were from different brands within the same organisation, with different 
main messages that are not about patience. Whatever the reason, it seems that these discreet messages 
would be more likely to be missed by consumers, though the repetition of the messages in different 
advertisements, would have compensated for that a little by increasing the opportunities to see the 
message. 
 
Explanation for Shortages 
The final major message to appear in advertisements in relation to shortages, concerned explanations 
for shortages and to a related but lesser extent apologies. While a variety of industry sectors included 
explanations for shortages in their messages, it was the confectionery and the food and drink sectors 
that both made the most use of explanations and used them most consistently.  
The use of explanations began in earnest in September 1940, and took a variety of different forms. 
For example the Cadbury’s advertisement in Figure 10 illustrates two different explanations in that it 
mentions supplies for the military, using the example of ‘paratroops’ and other government orders as 
well as reserves being held “to give vitamins to the starving children of  liberated Europe”. Other 
brands, also used the ‘government work’ explanation, such as Shredded Wheat. These were messages 
which were used throughout the war, linking the shortage of the brand to the war effort, and hence 
acceptance of the shortages becomes a patriotic duty. However, the linkage to ‘government work’ 
evolved as the end of the war came closer to become more specific about the use to which the 
government was putting the brand. Other advertisements such as those for ‘Camp’ Coffee, mentioned 
the limited supplies of raw materials. 
 
Figure 10 Cadbury Advertisement (Daily Express, 1 September 1943) 
Absent Brands 
The government control of the market resulted in either the total or partial absence (either in certain 
parts of Britain or for a short period of time) of some brands. Pooling for example, meant, as 
discussed above, that brands in several industries such as margarine and soft drinks disappeared 
completely. In zoned industries, brands would be absent from most of Britain. Other brands 
disappeared as ingredients disappeared. 
As discussed earlier, some absent brands, such as Stork and Quick Quaker Oats, attempted to 
maintain a presence in the consumers’ lives during the brand’s absence, while other brands which 
were absent simply stopped advertising, either for the duration or until close to the end. Some absent 
brands, such as Meltis “New Berry” Fruits simply looked ahead to the end of the war for their return 
as early as 1941, while others used military imagery to explain where the brand was. As has been 
mentioned, this was an attempt to position the brand with the war effort to remind consumers about its 
existence and maintain positive feelings about it for when it returned. 
For some brands as the war developed their absence was a deliberate strategy to avoid negative brand 
associations, by changing their name and branding rather than produce an inferior product, as a result 
of shortages of raw materials. An example of this was when Cadbury produced Ration Chocolate once 
the government banned the use of whole milk in chocolate (Figure 11). In cases like these advertising 
was needed to announce the change and simultaneously link the new brand to the old, while at the 
same differentiating them. The hope would be that customers of the original brand would transfer to 
the new, but would also recognise that it would not be up to the same standard as the original, so no 
negative associations would transfer back.  
 
Figure 11 Cadburys Ration Chocolate Advertisement (Daily Mirror, 29 October 1941) 
A number of confectionery brands took this approach, including Cadbury, launching the new 
Ration Chocolate and KitKat Chocolate Crisp which became Kit Kat, a name which has survived, 
albeit slightly adapted (to KitKat), to this day. The Ration Chocolate advertisement points out that 
“there’s none too much of it” and requests self-restraint on the part of customers, to “only ask for it if 
you need it”, again demonstrating how two messages can appear in the same advertisement. 
Advertising Message Framework 
This paper has explored the various ways in which advertising was impacted by government control 
of the food, drink and confectionery industries. From this a framework of messages relating to each 
form of control, along with shortages can be devised. Table III illustrates this Advertising Message 
Framework. 
 
Message Rationing Zoning Pooling Shortages Absent 
Brands 
Brand is not rationed X     
Doing without X  X  X 
Information X X X X X 
Explanation  X X X X 
Apology  X X X X 
After the war / victory  X X X X 
Be patient and wait for supplies  X  X  
Be patient with the shopkeeper X   X  
Making products last / go 
further 
X   X  
Make do and mend X   X X 
 
Table III Advertising Message Framework 
 
Table III indicates that while the provision of information is consistent across all forms of control 
as well as shortages, no other message is consistently used. This indicates that there was a difference, 
or at that brands perceived a difference, in the way that different forms of control impacted on 
consumers. One major difference that affected the message choice appears to have been whether the 
brand available at all (rationed, zoned or in short supply) or completely absent (pooled or absent for 
other reasons). This combined with the cause of the limited supply or absence of the brand meant 
there were a variety of options open to brands, many of which could have, and often did, use more 
than one message at a time. 
The framework clearly indicates that rationing had a very different effect on brands than zoning, 
pooling or shortages. As discussed earlier, this is because rationing impacted on demand for products, 
while zoning, pooling and shortages affected the supply of brands. Supply can be seen to be under the 
control of the brands, or the shopkeeper, while issues that impact on demand could not. The very clear 
implication is that consumers expected brands to maintain a supply and could respond negatively if 
they did not. When there were limitations on supply, brands felt the need to manage both consumers’ 
expectations and responses. The former was done by providing explanations and information and the 
latter, through apologising and asking for patience. 
Overall this Framework provides evidence that the government control of industry and of markets 
is much more complex and nuanced than the literature often indicates. There is no denying that 
rationing played a major role in ensuring that the British population got enough to eat and keep 
producing the supplies needed to fight a World War. It is also undeniable that rationing played a 
major part in shaping the experience of those on the British Home Front. However, the role of zoning 
and pooling in ensuring that British industry was in the most efficient shape has been understated, 
possibly because it does not appear often in diaries, at least explicitly.
 
Conclusions 
Much has been made in the historical literature of the impact of rationing on consumers on the British 
Home Front in the Second World War. This is understandable certainly, given that this impact looms 
large in primary literature. What is much less discussed however, is the control exerted by the 
government over the production and distribution of a large number of consumer goods, in particular 
zoning and pooling. This paper has been shown that the explicit mentions of this control in the diaries 
of the British public are few and far between, as well as being brief. Contemporary discussion of the 
impact of zoning and pooling were mainly limited to official government publications. While these 
could be argued to be overly positive, they do indicate that zoning and pooling played a fundamental 
part in helping British peacetime industry to reorganise into a more efficient wartime model. 
Newspaper advertising, particularly of food, drink and confectionery brands, provides another 
primary source that illustrates the impact on individual brands, and give an indication of what these 
brands thought the effects on consumers were. For example, the provision of information and 
apologising, imply that zoning and pooling created at least some confusion and negative feelings 
among consumers.  
The Advertising Message Framework indicates that the widest variety of messages were used in 
relation to both rationing and shortages. However, zoning, pooling and the simple absence of brands 
all prompted a variety of advertising messages designed to keep consumers informed about, reminded 
of and interested in, brands. These messages, which were mostly different to those used in relation to 
rationing, are an indication that these forms of control had a major impact on British industry and on 
British consumers and that this impact was broader than the impact of rationing and shortages alone. 
This research therefore finally, provides a strong argument that zoning and pooling should be included 
in any discussion of government control of markets during the Second World War. 
This paper takes the historical literature, both in relation to advertising in the Second World War 
and government control of industry, further. This is done by illustrating firstly that advertising was 
very responsive to external influences on the market, and that it can be used to explore the nature of 
those influences. Secondly, it has been shown that existing historical literature has failed to explore in 
detail a major part of the British government’s response to war and its impact on industry and 
consumers. 
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